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GRIM VARIATIONS
Fabio Lampert and John William Waldrop

Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of divine
omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all truths—
is false. We here focus on two such arguments: the set theoretic argument and the
semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run parallel to, respectively,
familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful arguments
against the classical doctrine of omniscience. What we are here interested in
is a way in which these arguments can be generalized. In particular, we show
how generalizations of these arguments can target, explicitly, alternatives to
the classical doctrine of omniscience, including what we here call restricted
omniscience and open future open theism. As a corollary, considerations of Grimstyle arguments do not support these alternatives to the classical doctrine of
omniscience over the classical doctrine. We conclude that what is paradoxical
is not the classical doctrine of omniscience just as such; rather, what is paradoxical is a core commitment shared by the classical doctrine and its more modest
alternatives, namely, the thesis that God is a perfectly logical reasoner.

1. Introduction
Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of
divine omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows
all truths—is false. In particular, we here have in mind to focus on two
such arguments: the set theoretic argument and the semantic argument. These
arguments run parallel to, respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory
and naive truth theory. It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful arguments against the classical
doctrine of omniscience. What we are here interested in is a way in which
these arguments can be generalized.1
In this article, first, we are mainly concerned to show that Grim-style
paradoxes arise given assumptions about God’s knowledge not nearly as
1
Grim’s arguments can be found in his articles “Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience,”
“There is No Set of All Truths,” “Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower,” and “Logic and the
Limits of Knowledge and Truth,” as well as in his book The Incomplete Universe. Some responses
to Grim’s arguments can be found in Bringsjord, “Grim on Logic and Omniscience”; Mar, “Why
‘Cantorian’ Arguments Against the Existence of God Do Not Work”; Simmons, “On an Argument
Against Omniscience”; Plantinga and Grim, “Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Arguments”;
Beall, “A Neglected Response to the Grim Result”; and Cotnoir, “Theism and Dialetheism.”
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strong as those imposed upon us by the classical doctrine of omniscience.
As a result, we show that the paradoxes arise explicitly for weaker alternatives to the classical doctrine. In particular, the paradoxes arise for alternatives to the classical doctrine that fall under the broad rubrics of restricted
omniscience and open theism. Several implications of this are briefly drawn
out. Finally, we conclude by giving the main philosophical upshot, which
will emerge over the course of this article: the paradoxes of omniscience
need not primarily owe to strong assumptions about the extent of God’s
knowledge, but can just as well be attributed to the logical perfection of
God’s knowledge. What is paradoxical is not just the idea of a God-like
knower, but also the constituent idea of a God-like logical reasoner, a
being of perfect rationality from a logical point of view.
2. Grim’s Paradoxes of Omniscience
The classical doctrine of divine omniscience requires that God knows all
truths.2 Alternatively, this entailment of the classical doctrine can be formulated as the thesis that God believes all truths and believes no falsehoods. It is this latter formulation that we assume in what follows. So, we
will say that the classical doctrine entails two theses:
no false: God believes no false propositions
all true: God believes all true propositions

Given this characterization of omniscience, God, as classically conceived,
comprehensively believes all truths and completely disbelieves all falsehoods. We will focus on two arguments due to Grim aimed at showing
that the classical doctrine gives rise to paradoxes, and is therefore false.
The first argument we call the set theoretic argument. If God believes all truths
and disbelieves all falsehoods, then the set of all propositions God believes is
just the set comprising all and only true propositions. But it can be shown that,
on pain of contradiction, no such set exists. The argument is as follows:
Suppose (i) there is a set S of all and only true propositions, (ii) for every set
of true propositions P  S there corresponds a true proposition pP—say, the
proposition that all elements of P are true—and (iii) for every P, Q  S, if
P z Q, then pP z pQ. Now, by the Axiom of Separation, there is a set R collecting all and only the true propositions of this sort that are not also members
of their corresponding set, that is:
R = {x ∈S | ∃P ⊆ S ( x = pP and x ∉ P )}

2
We assume, as stated, that this is an entailment of the classical doctrine. We by no means
assume that this entailment just is the classical doctrine. There is an interesting question,
which we here leave to the side, about the relationship between this entailment of the classical doctrine and scholastic characterizations of omniscience according to which the objects
of God’s knowledge are existing particulars or God Himself rather than, for example, truth
bearers.
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Because R  S there is also a corresponding true proposition pR. Assume
pR  R. Then pR is not an element of its corresponding set R. Since this is
what it means for something to be an element of R, it follows that pR  R.
So, discharging the assumption, we have shown pR  R only if pR  R, which
implies pR  R. So, we know pR  R. Now, it follows by definition of R
that for some P  S, pR pP and pR  P. But then R z P, and hence pR z pP.
Contradiction. Therefore, there is no set S of all and only true propositions.
That is, (i) is false.3

Since there cannot be a set of propositions large enough to be the set of
all propositions that God, according to the classical doctrine, believes, the
classical doctrine is therefore false.4
The second argument is what we call the semantic argument.5 If God
believes all truths and disbelieves all falsehoods, then any substitution
instance of the following schema comes out true, where M is a sentential
variable and the biconditional is material:
God believes that  ϕ  is true  ↔
 ϕ

But then we immediately run into paradoxes concerning sentences such as
1. God does not believe that (1) is true

To see this, let us assume that we are working in a language with sufficient
expressive richness to effect self-reference.6 Given a sentence M of the language, we will use the quotation ϕ as a singular term for M . (If you like,
take ϕ to be a Gödel number of M .) We also assume that among the predicates of the language is a predicate God believes (___), as our regimentation
of the open sentence “God believes that (. . .) is true” of ordinary English.
Suppose the doctrine of divine omniscience is true. Then, any substitution of a sentence of our language for M in the following schema comes
out true:
(O) God believes (ϕ) ↔ ϕ

3
We here follow the formulation in Menzel, “Sets and Worlds Again,” of the Russellian
Paradox of Propositions. This formulation does not appeal to Cantor’s theorem, in contrast to the
formulation in Grim, “There is No Set of All Truths.” Menzel points out the close connection
between Grim’s argument and Russell’s argument in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics.
4
At least, that is, insofar as the classical doctrine entails that there is a set of all truths that
God knows.
5
What we call the semantic argument is Grim’s variant of the Liar Paradox, which appears
in Grim, “Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience.”
6
This is a realistic assumption, from a consideration of natural language. There plainly
are unproblematic sentences of natural language that effect self-reference: this very sentence
does, for example. For our purposes, we can in the usual way simply say that the language
in which the above argument is formulated can arithmeticize its own syntax.
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Because we have the resources for self-reference, our language will contain a sentence α of which the following holds:
(α )α ↔ ¬ God believes (α)
This much facilitates the following argument:
1) α ∨ ¬ α

[Excluded middle]

2) α

[Assume for CP]
2.1) ¬ God believes (α)

[2; (α), MP]

2.2) α → God believes (α)

[Sub. (O), ( → )]

2.3) ¬ α

[2.1, 2.2; MT]

2.4) α ∧ ¬ α

[2, 2.3; ∧-I]

3) α → (α ∧ ¬ α )

[2–2.4; CP]

4) ¬ α

[Assume for CP]

4.1) ¬ ¬ God believes (α)

[4; (α), MP]

4.2) God believes (α)

[4.1; DN]

4.3) God believes (α) → α

[Sub. (O), ( → )]

4.4) ¬ God believes (α)
4.5) α

[4, 4.3; MT]
[4.4; (α), MP]

4.6) α ∧ ¬ α

[4, 4.5; ∧-I]

5) ¬ α → (α ∧ ¬ α )

[4–4.6; CP]

6) α ∧ ¬ α

[1, 3, 5; ∨-E]

So, we see that accepting unrestricted substitution into the schema (O)
above leads to a contradiction. But unrestricted substitution into the
schema (O) is just a regimentation of the classical doctrine of divine
omniscience: God believes something if and only if it is true. The classical
doctrine, according to Grim, is the culprit, and so the classical doctrine is
false.7

7
The first argument assumed that the classical doctrine entails that God believes all true
propositions and believes no false ones. The second assumed only that God believes that all
true sentences are true and believes of no false ones that they are true. But, one might protest,
these arguments do not actually target the same formulation of the doctrine of omniscience.
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3. Alternatives to the Classical Doctrine
The above arguments targeted the classical doctrine of divine omniscience. It
is instructive, in considering Grim’s arguments, to see how they fare against
alternatives to the classical view. The first such alternative is what we call
open future open theism (henceforth, open theism, for short), which has been variously defended by John Lucas, Dale Tuggy, Dean Zimmerman, and others.8
We are for present purposes taking open theism to be an alternative to
the classical doctrine because open theism adds to it the following metaphysical thesis:
open: Some propositions are neither true nor false

Typically, open is filled out by adding the further elaboration, which we
will here simply treat as characteristic of open theism:
f-open: Some propositions about the future are neither true nor false

The niceties of open theism’s exact relation to either of open or f-open are
not terribly important. What matters is that open theism adds some alethically purgative thesis to the classical doctrine.
Differing from open theism is a family of alternative views we call
restricted omniscience. Recall that the classical doctrine has two components, to wit, no false and all true. For our purposes, it will suffice to
This objection is beside the point. What we are concerned with is the first formulation, and
the second one can plausibly enough be taken to be an approximation of the former in the
sentential rather than the propositional idiom. Even if this latter is denied, it is obvious that
the first formulation entails the second. That is,
(⋆) God believes all and only true propositions only if God believes, of every true sentence, that it is true.
What would a counterexample to (⋆) be? In order for (⋆) to be false, there would have to
be a true sentence S that God did not believe to be true. But there cannot be such a sentence,
if the antecedent of (⋆) is satisfied. For S is true only if (a) S expresses some true proposition
p and (b) S is true iff p is. But, then, since S is true, p likewise is true (by (b)), and so God
believes that p is true. God also believes, though, that S is true, since God believes that p is
true and that S is true iff p is. So God does believe that S is true, which contradicts our supposition that S is a true sentence that God does not believe to be true. Thus, the first formulation
entails the second. For these reasons, any argument against the second we take to be an
argument against the first.
8
See Lucas, The Future; Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism”; and the two articles by
Zimmerman, “The A-Theory of Time” and “Open Theism and the Metaphysics of the SpaceTime Manifold.” For the sake of brevity, we are here being free with attaching an idiosyncratically narrow extension to “open theism.” As is plain from the above discussion, we are here
assuming that open theism constitutively involves denying the principle of bivalence. This
excludes open theists who accept bivalence (see Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” for a
critical discussion), and it in particular excludes those open theists who adopt a metaphysics
of time according to which future contingents are all false (see Todd, “Future Contingents are
all False!”). This is harmless in what follows. Since bivalent open theism does not differ from
the classical doctrine as regards the two issues of importance here—viz., bivalence and all
true—we can for present purposes regard bivalent open theism as a version of the classical
doctrine. Of course, by this we do not mean to venture an evaluation of the orthodoxy or
theological pedigree of bivalent open theism.
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characterize a restricted omniscience view as any view that includes no
false but rejects all true in favor of some restriction thereof.
There are diverse views that may be accordingly classified as restricted
omniscience views, by the lights of this characterization. These are generated by adding some qualification to all true9 which can be achieved by
filling out the following schema for some suitable open sentence ψ :
at-schema: God believes all true propositions p such that ψ (...p...)

Given this, consider the following three instances of at-schema:10
at-knowable: God believes all true propositions p such that p is knowable
to God
at-indexical: God believes all true propositions p such that p contains
no first-person indexical information (about some being other than God
Himself)
at-temporal: God believes all true propositions p such that p contains no
temporally indexical information

If we for example add at-knowable to no false we get something in
the vicinity of the view advanced at various points by William Hasker,
Richard Swinburne, and endorsed also by Peter van Inwagen, according to which God knows all truths that are knowable to him.11 A standard version of this view has it that God does not know some contingent
truths about what free agents will freely do in the future. Call this view
K-Restricted Omniscience.
Likewise, if we add to no false the thesis at-indexical we arrive at
a view motivated by arguments from Norman Kretzmann and Patrick
Grim.12 According to this view, truths like those expressed by sentences containing pronominal indexicals as, for example, “I am Norman
Kretzmann,” are not a part of God’s knowledge, as they can only be known
or believed by the individual herself who is designated by the indexical in
question. Call this view, I-Restricted Omniscience.
Finally, what we will in the obvious way call T-Restricted Omniscience is
the result of adding at-temporal to no-false, resulting in a view motivated by arguments due to Arthur Prior, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony
Kenny, Patrick Grim, and others.13 According to T-Restricted Omniscience,
God does not know some truths involving temporally indexical
9

And, of course, by rejecting the unqualified version of all true.
As formulated, these instances of at-schema might be stronger than what is required
by some relevant theorists. However, clearly the generalizations of Grim’s arguments below
apply just as well to views less restrictive than those broadly described here.
11
See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, “A Philosophical Perspective,” and Providence,
Evil and the Openness of God; Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, and van Inwagen, “What
Does an Omniscient Being Know About the Future?”
12
See Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immutability,” and Grim, “Against Omniscience.”
13
See Prior, “The Formalities of Omniscience”; Kretzmann, “Omniscience and
Immutability”; Kenny, The God of the Philosophers; and Grim, “Against Omniscience.”
10
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information. An example of the latter might be propositions at different
times expressed by the sentence “It is now cold in the sunroom.”
How do these views, including possible combinations thereof, fare
against Grim’s arguments? The set theoretic argument applies to any doctrine that entails unrestricted all true, and so it applies to open theism—
open theism entails the conjunction of no false and all true, with its
distinctive implications arising from the particular metaphysical theses it
adds to the classical doctrine. Open theism, though, does not bend under the
weight of the semantic argument; at least, not if it is consistent. To see this,
consider that any consistent view that entails open requires a denial of the
principle of bivalence, according to which every proposition is either true
or false. Correspondingly, the logic accompanying such a doctrine cannot
be classical—it must be a logic that does not validate the law of excluded
middle. But the law of excluded middle prominently figures in the above
formulation of the semantic argument. Given this, the consistent open theist will justly dismiss the semantic argument as presupposing a logic that
she does not—indeed, cannot, on pain of inconsistency—accept.14
What, now, of the three restricted omniscience views we have sketched,
including their combinations? As can easily be seen, both the set theoretic
argument and the semantic argument presuppose the truth of unrestricted
all true. If God can fail to believe some truth, then the thesis that there is
no set of all truths does not so much as suggest that there is no set of truths
that God believes, and so the set theoretic argument is impotent against
restricted omniscience views and their combinations alike. Likewise, if
God fails to believe some truth then some substitution for M in the left-toright direction of (O) is untrue, in which case the inference at stage 2.2 of
the semantic argument is unjustified.
As we see, then, though Grim’s arguments apply to the classical doctrine they do not uniformly apply to alternatives to the classical doctrine.
We will now show that strengthened versions of those arguments can be
mobilized not only against the classical doctrine of divine omniscience but
also against the substantially weaker alternatives just mentioned.
4. Paradoxes for the Alternative Doctrines
In this section we state generalizations of Grim’s arguments. We then discuss how the generalized arguments apply to alternative doctrines of
divine omniscience canvassed above.
4.1 The Generalized Set Theoretic Argument
The set theoretic argument targeted the claim that God believes all
and only the truths by establishing that there is no set of all such
14
We do not claim that a rejection of the law of excluded middle suffices to block the simple Liar paradox. We simply note that our version of the semantic argument assumes the law
of excluded middle, which we assume the open theist will reject. We are thankful to a referee
for encouraging us to emphasize this point.
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truths—the supposition that there is a set of all truths results in a contradiction. This motivates a recipe for generating similar arguments
against weaker alternatives to the classical doctrine: find a feature of
propositions such that God, according to a given weak alternative to
the classical doctrine, is supposed to know all truths with that feature,
and show that there is no set of all truths having that feature. If such
a feature can be found, and if the corresponding Grim-style argument
can be given, then the parallel conclusion follows: these weaker alternatives to the classical doctrine are false. What follows is one such
argument.
For clarification, we note that in what immediately follows we use
“truths” to mean true propositions, and by “self-identity,” used as a count
noun, we mean a trivial identity proposition of the same sort as the proposition that 2 = 2 , the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus, etc. For obvious reasons, we also operationally take these truths to be indexical-free,
tense-free, etc.
Suppose (i) there is a set S of all and only true self-identities, (ii) for every
set of true self-identities P  S there corresponds a true self-identity pP—say,
the proposition that P is self-identical—and (iii) for every P, Q  S , if P z Q,
then pP z pQ. Now, by the Axiom of Separation, there is a set R collecting all
and only the true propositions of the latter sort knowable to God that are not
also members of their corresponding set, that is:
R = {x ∈S | ∃ P ⊆ S ( x = pP and x ∉P )}
Because R  S there is also a corresponding true proposition pR knowable
to God. Assume pR  R. Then pR is not an element of its corresponding set
R. Since this is what it means for something to be an element of R, it follows that pR  R. So, discharging the assumption, we have shown pR  R
only if pR  R, which implies pR  R. So, we know pR  R. Now it follows by
definition of R that for some P  S, pR pP and pR  P. But then R z P, and
hence pR z pP. Contradiction. Therefore, there is no set S of all and only true
self-identities. That is, (i) is false.

Since the original set theoretic argument applied to open theism
besides also applying to the classical doctrine of omniscience, this
argument, which just generalizes the former one, obviously applies
to open theism just the same. This generalization of Grim’s set theoretic argument is more noteworthy for its application to restricted
omniscience views.
All self-identities are in principle knowable to God, since self-identities
are simply trivial logical truths and God knows all of those, no matter
what. By our operational characterization of self-identities, moreover, all
self-identities are devoid of the relevant indexical information. Given this,
the following are equivalent:
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(a) There is no set of all and only true self-identities
(b) There is no set of all and only true self-identities that are knowable to God
(c) There is no set of all and only true self-identities containing no information
essentially due to first-person indexicals
(d) There is no set of all and only true self-identities containing no information
essentially due to temporal indexicals

(a)-(d) can be extended, by trifling subset arguments, to target more familiar putative sets of propositions whose importance to restricted omniscience views is more obvious. First, there is no set of all true propositions
that are knowable to God. For if there were, some subset of that set would
be the mythical set of all and only true self-identities knowable to God.
But there is no such set, and so neither is there any such set as its proper
superset, the set of all truths knowable to God. So, K-Restricted Omniscience,
insofar as it entails that there is a set of all truths God knows, is false.
By the same sorts of considerations, given the conclusion that there is
no set of all and only true self-identities containing no information essentially due to first-person indexicals, we conclude that there is no set of all
truths containing such information. For if there were, then some subset of
that set would be the mythical set of all and only true self-identities containing no information essentially due to first-person indexicals. There is no
such set, and so neither is there any such set as one of its would-be proper
supersets, the set of all truths containing no information essentially due to
first-person indexicals. So, I-Restricted Omniscience, insofar as it entails that
there is a set of all truths God knows, is false.
Likewise for T-Restricted Omniscience: insofar as it entails that there is
a set of all truths God knows, T-Restricted Omniscience is false. This much
follows from the strengthened Grim-style argument above.
Therefore Grim-style set theoretic paradoxes afflict not only the classical
doctrine of divine omniscience: just the same, open theism and restricted
omniscience views give rise to Grim-style set theoretic paradoxes.
4.2 The Generalized Semantic Argument
Where before our semantic argument turned on the assumption that God
believes all truths and believes no falsehoods, this much is not available to
us in the case of restricted omniscience. Neither can we assume the principle of bivalence—nor its proof-theoretic correlate, the law of excluded
middle.
All the same, given the resources for self-reference, we can run a more
modest semantic argument against any view which, as open theism and
restricted omniscience views all do, entails no false—the thesis, recall,
that God believes no false propositions. This latter we will characterize by
accepting as true any substitution instance of the following schema:
(RO) God believes (ϕ) → ϕ
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This is simply the left-to-right direction of (O) above. We also assume that
God knows all logical truths, which we take to be a component of open
theism as well as the restricted omniscience views. This much we for present purposes codify as the following rule of proof:
nec: if M is provable without any undischarged assumptions, infer God
believes ( ϕ  )

Given (RO) and the acceptability of nec, we can likewise derive a contradiction. Given the resources for self-reference, we can have a Curryesque
sentence β in our language such that the following holds:
( β ) β ↔ (God believes (β ) → ⊥ )
(Where ⊥ is an arbitrary contradiction of our language.) This much facilitates the following argument:
1) God believes (β ) →β

[Sub. (RO)]

2) God believes (β ) → (God believes (β ) →⊥)

[1; (β)]

3) God believes (β ) →⊥

[2; Contr.]

4) β

[3; (β), MP]

5) God believes (β )

[4; nec]

6) ⊥

[3, 5; MP]

Grim’s semantic argument aimed to show that the classical doctrine,
according to which any substitution instance of (O) is true, resulted in
a sort of Liar-type paradox. This more modest argument shows that any
view that vindicates all substitution instances of (RO) and validates nec
results in a Curry-like paradox.15
Since the restricted omniscience views come with a commitment to no
false, and the acceptability of all substitution instances of (RO) is simply
our regimentation of no false, the restricted omniscience views on offer

15
The argument is informally presented in natural deduction given the legitimacy of the
rule of contraction used at line 3: the rule, that is, stating that ϕ → ϕ ’ can be inferred from
ϕ → ( ϕ → ϕ ’). Yet, a similar argument in Hilbert-style could be presented by simply adding
the logical theorem (i.e., relative to the underlying theory)

2.1) (God believes ( β  ) → (God believes ( β  ) → ⊥)) → (God believes ( β  ) → ⊥)
and then inferring line 3 from 2 and 2.1 by modus ponens. The argument here in fact establishes a version of Montague’s Paradox, i.e., the claim that any theory T in the first-order
language of arithmetic enriched with a unary predicate satisfying (RO) and nec, such that
T ⊇ Q, where Q is Robinson’s arithmetic, is inconsistent. However, the present argument, in
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are just as well committed to the acceptability of all substitution instances
of (RO). Similarly, we take it that on the restricted omniscience views canvassed above God believes all logical truths, and so we accordingly take
these restricted omniscience views to entail the validity of nec. So, the
above argument targets restricted omniscience just as much as the original
semantic argument targeted the classical doctrine.
As mentioned above, moreover, where the open theist will reject the
original semantic argument is with its dependence on the law of excluded
middle. The above argument, though, makes no use of the law of excluded
middle. Just so, then, the generalized semantic argument targets open theist views just as much as the original semantic argument targeted the classical doctrine.
5. Implications of the Preceding
As we indicated in §1, we decline to evaluate here whether or not Grim’s
arguments are successful against the classical doctrine of divine omniscience. This is the subject of much debate, and a position on this issue is
beyond the scope of this short article.16 What has so far not been widely
discussed is the way in which arguments very much like Grim’s apply just
as well to alternative doctrines of omniscience—doctrines that are much
less demanding than the classical doctrine. This much we have argued

contradistinction with Montague’s, does not make use of a Liar-like sentence. Kaplan and
Montague, “A Paradox Regained,” first mentioned that a similar result could be obtained
when the predicate in question is taken (intuitively) to represent knowledge (that is, the
Knower Paradox). Analogous inconsistency proofs but under different axioms have been
shown in Thomason, “A Note on Syntactical Treatments of Modality,” and McGee, “How
Truthlike Can a Predicate Be?” It is worth mentioning that, as has just been hinted at, some
of the authors referenced above have drawn connections between arguments like that given
above and the notion of knowledge, to which omniscience is obviously related. Thomason,
for example, draws morals from Montague’s paradox against Hintikka’s account of idealized knowledge as well as theories of content suggested by Fodor and others. The considerations we raise here differ from those otherwise gestured at in the literature insofar as we
make clear how theological alternatives to the classical doctrine of omniscience exhibit the
logical problems that Grim claims for the classical doctrine. Grim himself connects paradoxes similar to Montague’s (i.e., the Knower) with the classical doctrine, though not with
weaker extant alternatives to the classical doctrine (see Grim, “Truth, Omniscience, and the
Knower,” and also Grim, The Incomplete Universe). The main purpose of the present generalization of the semantic argument is precisely that of making such connections explicit, and an
advantage of the present argument to that end consists in its being essentially independent
of issues concerning negation and the law of excluded middle.
16

In Lampert and Waldrop, “Propositional Omniscience,” we offer our preferred solution
to the paradoxical problems posed by the semantic argument, which converges with a solution to the set theoretic argument suggested in Beall, “A Neglected Response to the Grim
Result.” A recent proposal regarding God’s relationship to the set theoretic universe which
suggests a response to the set theoretic argument is Christopher Menzel’s theological activism, as developed in Menzel, “The Argument from Collections.”
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for in the foregoing sections. In particular, we have so far seen that Grimstyle arguments can be advanced given strictly weaker assumptions than
those imposed upon us by the classical doctrine, and these more modest
arguments apply not only to the classical doctrine but also and explicitly
to open theism and various restricted omniscience views.
It might have been thought, antecedently, that Grim-style considerations could serve as reasons to adopt some alternative doctrine of omniscience. That is, for the theist, there might have been a temptation to argue
as follows:
P1 God is omniscient, at least in some sense.
P2 If God is omniscient, at least in some sense, then open theism, some
restricted omniscience view, or the classical doctrine is true.
P3 Grim-style arguments show that the classical doctrine of omniscience is
not true.
C Therefore, open theism or some restricted omniscience view is true.

This is a fine argument. But an implication of what we have so far said is
that this argument is unavailable to partisans of alternative doctrines of
omniscience, since the parallel argument
P1 God is omniscient, at least in some sense.
P2 If God is omniscient, at least in some sense, then open theism, some
restricted omniscience view, or the classical doctrine is true.
P3* Grim-style arguments show that neither open theism nor some restricted
omniscience view is true.
C Therefore, the classical doctrine is true.

is available to the advocate of the classical doctrine just the same, and
what we have said in the preceding entails that the only premises differing between the two arguments—premises P3 and P3*—are on a par. So
Grim-style considerations cannot serve as a reason to prefer an alternative
doctrine of divine omniscience to the classical doctrine.
Another obvious implication of the preceding is related: since Grimstyle arguments afflict weaker views than the traditional doctrine, what
leads to paradoxes cannot be the classical doctrine just as such. Rather,
what results in paradox must be some subterranean feature of the classical
doctrine that the classical doctrine and its alternatives have in common.
Finally, we take it that this subterranean feature of the classical doctrine that results in paradox is not its extraordinary entailments concerning how much God knows or concerning God’s knowledge of diverse
and recherché subject matters. This may have been suggested by Grim’s
arguments, as both assumed that God knows everything. As we have seen,
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though, similar paradoxes arise given more modest assumptions about
what God knows.
In both of our generalized Grim-style arguments above, we need no
such special assumption about the extent of God’s knowledge or about
what sorts of truths God can know. That is, except for one: both arguments
assume that God, no matter what, knows all logical truths. In fact, the set
theoretic argument assumes—at least explicitly—only that God knows
all of a certain privileged class of logical truths. In more impressionistic
terms, both generalized Grim-style arguments build in assumptions that
reflect the common view that God is in some sense a perfect logical reasoner.
Given this, it is not at all surprising that more modest alternatives to the
classical doctrine of omniscience do not avoid the paradoxes, since none
of the alternatives to the classical doctrine qualify the logical perfection of
God’s knowledge.
In conclusion, then, we say that the paradoxicality of divine omniscience, by the lights of Grim-style considerations, resides in a heretofore
undertheorized feature of God’s knowledge: God’s status as a being of
perfect rationality from a logical point of view.17
University of Greifswald
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